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Euroscepticism as 
Anti-Centralization
A Rational Choice Institutionalist
Perspective
Simon Hix
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
A B S T R A C T
From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Euro-
scepticism is little more than a set of preferences by citizens,
parties and interest groups about institutional design in
Europe. If actors’ expect policy outcomes to move closer to
their ideal positions as a result of European integration, they
will be Euro-enthusiastic (as many centrists are). But, if they
feel that policies will move further away from their ideal
positions, they will be Eurosceptic (as many extremists are).
This simple idea has broad historical and geographical
relevance, relating to how actors view the design of multi-
level polities, and how these institutional preferences
change in response to policy outcomes of the central
institutions.
1 3 1
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507073291
Volume 8 (1): 131–150
Copyright© 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
K E Y  W O R D S
 Euroscepticism
 institutionalism
 public opinion
 rational choice
Harold Laski was a prominent academic, politician and public intellectual in
American and British political life in the middle of the 20th century. Laski
taught at Harvard during the First World War, when he started a close friend-
ship with US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, was a Professor
of Political Science at the London School of Economics from the mid-1920s,
and was a prominent intellectual figure in the British Labour Party in the
1930s and 1940s, including being its Chairman in 1945–6 during the Attlee
Labour government. Throughout his life he was a staunch socialist and pro-
ponent of using government to promote the economic and social trans-
formation of capitalist society in Britain and the United States (see Kramnick
and Sheerman, 1993).
Why is Harold Laski interesting for the topic of Euroscepticism? Laski
was a vocal opponent of the US federal government and a defender of states’
rights. The reason, he contended, was that socialism was impossible to build
in the USA from Washington, DC (e.g. Laski, 1948). This is a striking
conclusion for a scholar of the USA in the 1930s and 1940s, given the trans-
formation of US policies and politics with the New Deal. However, this obser-
vation is similar to more recent analysis of how the institutional design of the
US federal government has prevented the development of a welfare state,
mainly because multiple veto-players and malapportionment in the Senate
produce policy outcomes that are strongly biased towards the status quo (see
Lipset and Marks, 2000; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). The conclusion reached
by Laski, and by some recent thinkers, is that the only way to achieve
progressive policies in the USA is via a decentralization of powers to the
states.
But the story does not stop there. A debate raged in the UK in the 1930s
and 1940s about whether the UK should become a federal state, with
devolved parliaments and powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
In contrast to the anti-centralization position he held for the USA, in this
context Laski was vehemently opposed to any decentralization of powers
from Westminster and Whitehall. His logic: that socialism could not be built
in Britain unless it was dictated from the centre. This time, he was in favour
of a centralization of policy powers because this was the best way to achieve
universal health care, pensions and education.
At face value one might accuse Laski of inconsistency: in one context he
opposed centralization while in another context he supported it. However,
looking deeper there is no inconsistency whatsoever. Laski, like any rational
policy-seeking actor, was primarily motivated by his basic policy preferences:
greater redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, the provision of universal
public goods, the regulation of free markets, and various other policies typical
of socialist parties, voters and thinkers in the mid-twentieth century. Where
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centralization would undermine these policy outcomes, as in the USA in the
1920s (or so he believed), he was in favour of decentralization. Yet, where
centralization would promote these policy outcomes, as in the UK in the
1940s, he was opposed to decentralization. Hence, given his primary socio-
economic preferences and his assumptions about which design of govern-
ment was most likely to achieve these outcomes, he was consistent in his
preferences about the design of policy competences between the higher and
lower levels of government in the United States and the UK.
Put this way, Laski was a precursor of many recent political scientists, such
as Ken Shepsle, Douglass North, Barry Weingast and George Tsebelis, who
argue that, if institutions determine policy outcomes, then actors’ preferences
about the design of institutions should follow from their preferences over
policies. Laski was perhaps an early rational choice institutionalist!
This puts Euroscepticism in a more general theoretical and historical
context. Citizens and party leaders may simply have attitudes towards the
European Union (EU) and European integration that are derived from their
primary preferences over policies and the assumptions they make about the
likelihood of achieving these policies at the domestic and European levels. If
citizens are unhappy with the domestic policy regime and believe that further
European integration or action at the European level would produce policies
that they favour, then they are likely to be pro-European (e.g. Ray, 2004;
Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). Conversely, if citizens either believe that European
integration or EU policies have led to policy outcomes that are less desirable
than the previous domestic policy status quo, or believe that the EU reduces
the likelihood that domestic policies will move in their preferred direction,
then they are likely to be Eurosceptic. This seems like a relatively simple set
of ideas, yet may go quite some way towards explaining why some citizens
and political parties are opposed to the EU whereas others are in favour, and
why citizens and parties have changed their attitudes towards European inte-
gration as the EU and/or their domestic governments have changed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section
I set out a rational choice institutionalist theory of Euroscepticism in more
detail. I then discuss how far this approach explains Euroscepticism towards
the EU Constitution, and compare this approach to the approaches adopted
by the papers in this special issue. Finally, section four concludes.
A rational choice institutionalist approach to Euroscepticism
A rational choice institutionalist approach to Euroscepticism has several intel-
lectual roots. In the political economy literature, Bolton and Roland (1997)
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propose a formal model of the break-up and unification of states (see
Wittman, 1991). Their model starts with some assumptions about the
economic policy preferences of citizens and the likelihood of conflicts over
redistributive policies at different levels of government. Citizens with
incomes that are considerably closer to a local median than to a higher
system-wide median would oppose economic redistribution at the central
level, because this would be likely to make them worse off than would
deciding how wealth is redistributed by a local majority. In the European
integration context, the EU may not have much of a direct impact on
economic redistribution in the member states (given that the size of the EU
budget is approximately 1% of EU gross domestic product), but the indirect
impact of the EU policy regime on the ability of states to redistribute wealth
is potentially large, as a result of the single market and economic and
monetary union. From Bolton and Roland, this would suggest that poorer
citizens in highly redistributive states (such as Sweden) and richer citizens
in states with low levels of income distribution (such as the United Kingdom)
are both likely to be more Eurosceptic than citizens at the other ends of the
income scale in these states.
Similarly, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) built a general model of ‘the
optimal size of states’ based on a cost–benefit trade-off between the benefits
of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Their model is primarily normative –
relating to what should be the appropriate design of government given a
particular structure of preferences across a variety of policy areas. However,
it is also positive – relating to the conditions under which states should break
up or unify. In this regard, states where the median citizens’ preferences are
highly divergent from those of the likely system-wide median citizen should
prefer to exit a polity. Alesina and Spolaore focus on citizens’ preferences for
economic openness, which may or may not correlate with general left–right
preferences. However, the same logic should hold for general socioeconomic
preferences, as expressed in the left–right dimension of politics. For example,
citizens in states where the median voter is considerably to the left of the
European average and citizens in states where the median voter is consider-
ably to the right of the European average should expect that a European-wide
median voter would prefer considerably different policies from their own
preferences and so should be opposed to endowing this voter with policy-
making power by passing competences up to the European level.
Some of the existing theories of citizens’ general attitudes towards the
EU and European integration also fit a rational choice institutionalist frame-
work. Gabel’s (1998) work on the relationship between economic interests and
support for European integration is particularly apt. Gabel points out that
European integration forces member states to liberalize their markets and
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open up to capital mobility, which increases the value of the assets possessed
by those with higher incomes and higher levels of education. As a result,
citizens who possess high levels of ‘human capital’ (in terms of economic
assets and education) are less likely to be anti-European than citizens with
lower levels of human capital.
Anderson’s (1998) argument about the role of domestic institutions in
channelling attitudes towards the EU also fits a rational choice institutionalist
perspective. In this influential paper, Anderson argues that citizens’ attitudes
towards the EU are shaped by their attitudes towards their domestic political
system, their domestic government and the established political parties in their
state. If citizens perceive that they are gaining their preferred policies in their
domestic system, either because they like their political system, or because
they voted for the incumbent government, or because they feel their
preferences are well represented by the main political parties, then they are
less likely to feel that transferring policies to the European level will produce
better policy outcomes than the ones they already have domestically. Similarly,
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) finds that citizens are more likely to be Eurosceptic if
they have a low opinion of the European-level institutions and a high opinion
of their domestic institutions, including the party in government at the time
and the performance of the domestic system in the provision of public goods.
Nevertheless, Rohrschneider (2002) has an alternative perspective: if citizens
‘trust’ their domestic institutions, they are also likely to trust the EU insti-
tutions – presumably because they trust what their leaders are doing at the
EU level.
Finally, the extensive work on the relationship between the institutional
design of government and policy outcomes is also relevant. The design of
representation and decision-making influences the likelihood of policy
change, in absolute terms, as well as the particular direction of policy change.
For example, where a system has multiple veto-players and these veto-players
have highly divergent preferences, then policies are difficult to change once
they have been adopted (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). In contrast, where a system
allows for a particular majority to come to power, control agenda-setting and
pass legislation, then policies can be changed quickly in one direction or
another. However, the likely direction of policy change also depends on the
structure of representation in the system of government. If one particular set
of interests is overrepresented relative to its numerical weight in the popu-
lation, policy is more likely to move in the direction of the preferences of these
interests than in the opposite direction.
Consider the example of economic redistribution in the United States.
Those opposed to redistribution are well represented in the US Senate because
the small conservative Southern and Western states are overrepresented in
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this chamber relative to the large liberal North Eastern and West Coast states.
When this malapportionment is combined with the myriad of checks and
balances in the US federal government, it is not surprising that the federal
government does not engage in significant direct economic redistribution.
Hence, conservative voters in the USA are more likely than are liberal voters
to see their preferences secured at the federal level – as Laski pointed out.
Building from this basis we can set out the following basic assumptions
of a rational choice institutionalist theory of Euroscepticism:
First, an actor (a citizen, political party or interest group) is primarily
driven by policy outcomes, and will form an opinion about the EU on the
basis of whether action at the EU level will produce policies that are closer
to his or her preferred policies than existing policy outcomes at the domestic
level.
Second, when deciding whether to support or oppose the EU, an actor
will weigh up the following factors:
(1) whether the existing EU policy regime is closer to or further away from
his or her preferred set of policies than the domestic policy regime;
(2) the likely direction of policy change at the domestic level, given the
prevailing political climate in the domestic arena and the design of
domestic institutions (the number of veto-players and how well/badly
he or she is represented at the domestic level); and
(3) the likely direction of policy change at the European level, given the
prevailing political climate at the European level and the design of the
EU institutions (the number of veto-players and how well/badly he or
she is represented at the European level).
Third, party leaders and interest groups are likely to be much better
informed than citizens about the policy consequences of action at the 
EU level. As a result, citizens are likely to rely on ‘cues’ from parties and
interest groups about how EU actions relate to their own preferences (in
terms of the likely direction of domestic policy change as a result of EU
action) – as Steenbergen et al. as well as Gabel and Scheve assume in their
articles in this issue.
Given the structure of preferences and institutions at the domestic and
European levels, a series of inferences about actors’ attitudes towards the EU
logically follow from these assumptions. For example, two propositions
should hold across country and across time:
1. Voters and parties on the extreme left and extreme right are more likely to be
Eurosceptic than are centrist voters and parties.
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If policies at the European level are likely to be close to some notional
European-wide median voter, then voters and parties that are a long way
from this median are likely to be the most Eurosceptic, all other things being
equal. This is also consistent with an interpretation of attitudes of extreme
parties and voters towards the EU as a form of anti-establishment populism
(Taggart, 1998). If the (moderate) establishment is pro-EU, then those groups
that are likely to gain from undermining the position of the centrist parties
and the elites are likely to oppose the EU. It would not even be necessary to
work out whether EU policy is good or bad, but simply sufficient to take one’s
cues from the fact that those who support European integration tend to
support moderate and centrist policies; hence, if one opposes these policies,
then one should oppose the EU.
2. Citizens and interest groups who support governing parties are less likely to
be Eurosceptic.
Parties in government not only control the domestic policy agenda but also
are the central actors at the European level: setting the long-term agenda in
the European Council, passing legislation in the Council, and picking the
Commissioners. As a result, governing parties are more likely than opposi-
tion parties to be able to shape policy outcomes at the European level in their
preferred direction. Hence, voters for governing parties, and interest groups
who are close to parties in government, are less likely to be Eurosceptic than
are voters for opposition parties and interest groups who are close to oppo-
sition parties, all other things being equal (see Sitter, 2001).
Two further propositions should explain variations in Euroscepticism
across a country:
3. Where a member state’s domestic policy regime is to the left(right) of the
European average, voters and parties on the left(right) are more likely than voters
on the right(left) to be Eurosceptic, and vice versa.
If the EU is likely to produce policies close to a notional European-wide voter,
this would mean a move rightwards for member states with domestic policy
regimes that are on the left, and a move leftwards for member states with
domestic policy regimes that are on the right. As a result, and following the
logic of the political economy literature discussed above, European inte-
gration is likely to mean that policies will move further away from actors on
the left in the first set of states and from actors on the right in the second set
of states. For example, voters and parties on the left in Sweden, Denmark,
Finland, Germany and France are likely to be more Eurosceptic than voters
and parties on the right, and the reverse is likely to be true in the United
Kingdom, Southern Europe, and some parties of Central and Eastern Europe.
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4. Voters and parties in domestic systems that have majoritarian systems of
government are more likely to be Eurosceptic than voters and parties in domestic
systems with consensus systems of government.
This inference might be observationally equivalent to some of the propositions
in the Europeanization literature about how the match or mismatch between
domestic and EU-level regimes affects policy-makers’ attitudes towards
Europe (e.g. Cowles et al., 2000). However, the logic here is different. In con-
sensus systems, with proportional representation and traditions of coalition
government, most policies are close to the domestic median voter and policy
change is difficult (Powell, 2000; Tsebelis, 1999). In majoritarian systems, in
contrast, with plurality elections and traditions of single-party government,
policy change (in one direction or another) is more likely. Regardless of the
system, most parties and voters are not at the position of the median voter
and so prefer some policy change. In consensus systems, allowing policies to
be made at the European level might ‘unblock’ the domestic checks and
balances and so increase the chances of policy change. In majoritarian systems,
in contrast, allowing policies to be made at the European level might prevent
likely policy change at the domestic level.
A higher fragmentation in the party system in proportional systems, as
a result of strategic voting behaviour and lower entry thresholds, would
suggest that there is more room for Eurosceptic parties in these systems than
in majoritarian systems. However, what I am suggesting here is that main-
stream parties, which have a reasonable chance of forming a government, are
more likely to be Eurosceptic in majoritarian systems than in consensus
systems. This is because, in majoritarian systems, the main centre–left and
centre–right parties have a reasonable chance of governing as a single party
at some point in the not too distant future, and so have an incentive not to
constrain the hands of the domestic government by passing policy com-
petences up to the European level. In consensus systems, in contrast, the main
parties on the centre–left and centre–right are unlikely to be able to govern
unencumbered at the domestic level, and so may rationally prefer to delegate
powers up to the European level to overcome domestic blockages. Hence,
mainstream parties and their supporters in states where ‘grand coalitions’ or
multiple checks and balances tend to block policy change, such as Italy,
Germany, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, Finland or the Netherlands, are less
likely to be Eurosceptic than are mainstream parties and their supporters in
states where single-party or ‘single bloc’ government is the norm, such as the
United Kingdom, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland or Malta.
Finally, the EU has changed dramatically in the past three decades and
these changes should lead to changes over time in terms of which groups are
Eurosceptic. There are three relevant changes in this regard:
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(1) change in the policy agenda – from initial liberalization in the common
market and single market from the 1950s to the 1980s, to social and
environmental re-regulation in the 1990s, to the current liberalization
drive in the Lisbon Agenda in the 2000s;
(2) change in the political make-up of the EU institutions – from a dominant
position for centre–right politicians in the Council and Commission in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, to a dominant position for the centre–left
in the Council, Commission and European Parliament in the mid to late
1990s, to a dominant position for the centre–right in all three EU insti-
tutions since 2004; and
(3) change in the design of the EU institutions and the structure of represen-
tation at the European level – where treaty reforms (such as increasing
the power of the European Parliament in the legislative process) and EU
enlargement have reduced the power of the larger member states and
decreased the likelihood of policy change at the European level, as a result
of the increase in the number and heterogeneity of preferences of the 
veto-players.
These changes lead to two further inferences about variations in actors’
attitudes towards the EU over time:
5. Voters and parties on the left were more Eurosceptic in the 1970s, 1980s and
2000s, whereas voters and parties on the right were more Eurosceptic in the 1990s.
This inference logically follows from the first and second sets of changes –
the shifting policy agenda of the EU, and the related shift in the political
make-up of the EU institutions. In the 1970s and 1980s and again in the 2000s,
parties and voters on the left are likely to have viewed the EU as undermin-
ing domestic welfare policies and redistributive mechanisms. In this period,
voters for left-wing parties are likely to perceive the EU as promoting pri-
vatization of public utilities and fostering service sector and labour market
liberalization, and so acting against the interests of less-skilled workers,
organized labour and public sector workers, regardless of who is in power
at the domestic level. On the opposite side, in the 1990s, parties and voters
on the right are likely to have viewed the EU as undermining domestic efforts
to liberalize and deregulate markets. In this period, voters for right-wing
parties were likely to perceive the EU as promoting the interests of environ-
mentalists, trade unions and producer groups against the interests of small
and medium-sized enterprises, which are faced with growing ‘Brussels red
tape’.
6. Voters, parties and interest groups in large member states have become more
Eurosceptic.
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This inference logically follows from the third set of changes, relating to the
treaty reforms and EU enlargement. The dominance of the larger member
states in decision-making in the EU has gradually eroded as a result of the
addition of the European Parliament in the legislative process, the removal
of a second Commissioner from each of the larger member states, and the
addition of 10 new states, most of which are small states. As a result, actors
in the larger member states are less likely than before to be able to secure
their preferred policy outcomes from the EU, and so are less likely to be
supportive of actions at the European level. This does not mean that actors
in the smaller member states will have become more pro-European. Although
the power of the larger states has declined, the power of the smaller states
has not necessarily increased. Rather, what has happened is a levelling of the
states’ power at the European level, where the traditional ‘big three’ of France,
Germany and the United Kingdom are no longer able to dominate the policy
agenda, whether individually, bilaterally or collectively.
In addition to these six inferences, there are many other potential in-
ferences from the basic assumptions of a rational choice institutionalist frame-
work. Nevertheless, the aim here is simply to illustrate that a rational choice
institutionalist framework can generate a rich set of propositions about how
and why the attitudes of citizens, parties and interest groups towards the EU
might vary across time and space.
An application: Euroscepticism and the EU Constitution
One simple test of the basic framework is to look at public attitudes in each
of the member states towards the EU Constitution. The Eurobarometer 62.1
survey was conducted in October and November 2004 in all 25 EU member
states and included a batch of questions on the Constitution.1 One question
was:
‘According to what you know, would you say that you are in favour of or opposed
to the draft European Constitution? Answer options: Totally in favour, Rather in
favour, Rather opposed, Totally opposed, Don’t Know.’
To look at the relationship between an individual’s basic policy prefer-
ences and his or her attitude towards the Constitution we can also look at the
question that asked citizens about their basic ideological orientation:
‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right’” How would you
place your views on this scale? (Left) 1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 (Right).’
One way of calculating the average attitude of each citizen at each point on
this left–right scale in each member state is to take the percentage who were
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in favour of the Constitution (those who were ‘totally in favour’ plus those
who were ‘rather in favour’) minus the percentage who were opposed to the
Constitution (those who were ‘rather opposed’ plus those who were ‘totally
opposed’). The relationship between the underlying policy preferences and
attitudes towards the Constitution can then be estimated by fitting a quadratic
regression model to the data for each member state. One should be careful
when interpreting the results, because there are only a small number of
respondents at some of the extreme points for some of the smaller member
states (1, 2, 9 or 10). Nevertheless, if one focuses on the relative attitudes of
the centre–left, centre and centre–right, there were four distinct patterns of
Euroscepticism towards the Constitution in the autumn of 2004.
First, Figure 1 shows the seven member states where the left was more
Eurosceptic about the Constitution than the right. Most of these member
states have domestic policy regimes that are clearly to the left of the EU
average. For example, the level of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in 2004 in five of these states was well above the EU average (of 45%): Sweden
had 57% of GDP in the public sector, Denmark had 56%, Finland had 51%,
Greece had 50%, and Malta had 49%.2 Voters on the right in these states
presumably felt that EU-level policies as a result of the Constitution would
move these domestic policy outcomes closer to their preferences, whereas
voters on the left in these states felt the opposite. This also explains why the
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Figure 1 Left Euroscepticism.
anti-European parties that fight European Parliament elections in Denmark
and Sweden are on the left, and why the radical left parties in Greece and the
mainstream left-wing party in Malta are both anti-European. However,
Ireland and the Czech Republic do not fit this model, as these two states have
domestic policy regimes considerably to the right of the EU average, with
relatively deregulated labour markets and service sectors and levels of public
expenditure below the European average.
Second, Figure 2 shows the four member states where the right was more
Eurosceptic than the left. The United Kingdom fits the simple rational choice
institutionalist framework best in this regard, in that the domestic policy
regime in the UK, with a liberal labour market and service sector, is consid-
erably to the right of the EU average. As a result, voters on the left might
reasonably have assumed that the EU Constitution would enable new labour
rights and social standards to be introduced into the UK. Against this, the UK
Independence Party and the Conservative Party are strongly opposed to
Brussels imposing ‘socialism through the back door’, as Margaret Thatcher
once put it. Poland also fits this model, where the left feels that the EU Consti-
tution would introduce new social rights that are currently lacking in Poland,
such as gender equality and gay rights. However, Germany and Austria are
a puzzle. As ‘coordinated economies’, one would expect voters on the right
in these states to be more favourable towards the EU’s efforts to liberalize
European Union Politics 8(1)1 4 2
100
80
60
40
20
0
–20
–40
–60
–80
10987654321
%
 in
 f
av
o
u
r 
o
f 
E
U
 C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
 m
in
u
s 
%
 o
p
p
o
se
d
 
Left–right self-placement of voters
Poland (R2 = .59)
Germany (R2 = .83)
Austria (R2 = .55)
United Kingdom (R2 = .83)
Figure 2 Right Euroscepticism.
domestic labour markets and the service sector, and voters on the left to
defend the domestic status quo.
Third, Figure 3 shows the only member state, France, where both extremes
were Eurosceptic while the centre was strongly pro-Europe. This ‘inverted U’
shape is the classic model of attitudes towards the EU, where Euroscepticism
was the preserve of the anti-system and populist extremes (Taggart, 1998;
Aspinwall, 2002). It is perhaps surprising, then, that only 1 of the 25 member
states fitted this pattern in 2004. Moreover, even France did not fit this pattern
for long: by the time of the French referendum in May 2005, the opposition to
the Constitution was mainly on the centre–left and extreme left, within the
French Socialist Party and from the various communist and Trotskyist groups.
This suggests that, by the time of the referendum, voters had more precise
estimates of the likely direction of the EU policy agenda as a result of the
Constitution. If it is unclear what the EU represents, both the centre–left and
the centre–right can be pro-European. However, once it becomes clear that the
EU will produce policy outcomes in a particular direction, then it is more diffi-
cult for both the centre–left and the centre–right to be equally pro-European,
because one or other of these two groups is likely to be better off as a result
of the likely new EU policies.
Finally, Figures 4 and 5 show that a large number of member states
amongst the ‘old 15’ and the ‘new 10’ had no clear pattern of Euroscepticism.
In all these states, voters on the left were almost as pro-European as voters
on the right. Presumably for these states there are no clear domestic redistri-
butional effects of European integration. As a result, no social group strongly
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Figure 3 Extremist Euroscepticism.
defended a domestic policy regime against possible change brought about by
the EU Constitution.
What is perhaps most striking, however, is the location of the Nether-
lands in this group of non-Eurosceptic states. In June 2005, almost two-thirds
of Dutch citizens voted against the EU Constitution in the Dutch referendum.
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Figure 4 No Euroscepticism: old member states.
Figure 5 No Euroscepticism: new member states.
Also, opposition to the Constitution in the referendum came from across the
Dutch political spectrum. One reason for this was the growing realization that
the Dutch would be the largest net contributors per capita in the 2007–14 EU
budget. Since these costs would fall more or less equally across Dutch society,
what happened was a wholesale collapse in the level of support at all points
on the left–right dimension. From a perception in the Netherlands for many
years that ‘everyone gains from Europe’, the perception by the time of the
2005 referendum was that ‘everyone loses from Europe’.
The articles in this issue of EUP
As Liesbet Hooghe points out in the introduction to this issue, the papers 
in this issue focus on two key issues: first, whether parties are driven by
strategic or ideological considerations when taking positions on Europe; and,
second, whether parties lead voters or voters lead parties. Both these concerns
relate to the theoretical approach I have developed here.
On the issue of party motivations, the rational choice institutionalist
theory suggests that the ideological and strategic considerations of parties
should interact. On the ideological side, parties are primarily policy-seekers,
which suggests that their positions on the EU should be determined by their
positions on the key socioeconomic questions in domestic politics, as captured
by the left–right dimension. On the strategic side, however, parties are more
likely to be able to secure their policy positions at the European level if they
are in government than if they are in opposition.
This perspective is consistent with Ben Crum’s findings about the
behaviour of parties in the referendums on the EU Constitution. The strategic
dilemma was greatest for opposition parties that supported the Constitution:
should they back the Constitution and miss an opportunity to inflict a
damaging defeat on the parties in government? In general, the leaderships of
these parties stuck with their underlying policy preferences, to endorse the
Constitution, while the voters for these parties were split. Furthermore, in 
left-wing opposition parties these internal party splits were driven less by
strategic considerations than by different policy evaluations. Whereas the
moderate left (and the elites in most centre–left parties) felt that they could
still achieve their policy goals at the European level and that the EU Consti-
tution was not necessarily a constraint on their domestic policy goals, the more
radical left (and many of the rank-and-file of moderate left parties) perceived
that the EU was increasingly promoting market liberalization and constrain-
ing domestic redistributive and regulatory policies. As a result, the French
Socialist Party, the Dutch Labour Party and Luxembourg Socialist Workers’
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Party were split down the middle in the referendums, because both policy
preference and strategic considerations split the moderate party leaderships
from the more radical party activists and from many party voters.
The rational choice institutionalist arguments also partly fit the evidence
presented in Hanspeter Kriesi’s analysis of the role of Europe in national
election campaigns. Looking at six countries, Kriesi finds that opposition to
the EU is not the preserve only of opposition parties and that parties’ 
positions on European integration are generally consistent with their basic
socioeconomic policy profiles. For example, extremist parties in all cases are
strongly anti-European. This is partly a function of protest politics, but it is
more decidedly a function of the realization that European integration
generally locks in moderate policy outcomes that are hard to change. The
explanation also fits the anti-European positions of the British, Swiss and
Austrian conservatives. The British conservatives opposed European inte-
gration in the 1990s because they saw it as promoting interventionist and
regulatory economic policies. For economic policy reasons, one might assume
that the Swiss and Austrian conservatives should be pro-European, on the
grounds that European integration would liberalize their domestic policy
regimes. However, Kriesi points out that these parties are primarily concerned
with sociocultural issues, and hence see European integration as promoting
more liberal social policies, such as immigration, which undermines their
traditional domestic stances on these issues (which is similar to the position
of the Polish conservatives).
Seth Jolly’s analysis of regionalist parties also fits well. The primary
policy goal of regionalist parties is decentralization, and in some cases
independence. Most regionalist parties are also policy outliers, on the left or
right of the political spectrum, because they are unsatisfied with policies
emanating from their national capitals. These two policy perspectives fit
together well in the case of the Scottish National Party, which favours
independence and is to the left of the Labour Party. Promoting European inte-
gration is a means to achieve both these goals – undermining the sovereignty
of Westminster and promoting market re-regulation in Brussels against
generally more free market and deregulatory policies from London. However,
for some regionalist parties the decentralization and socioeconomic policy
goals conflict when it comes to Europe, as with the Italian Northern League
(Lega Nord), which used to be strongly pro-European but is now opposed to
what it sees as left-wing interference from Brussels in collusion with Rome.
Turning to the issue of the relationship between parties and voters, the
rational choice institutionalist framework I have outlined is relatively
ambiguous. The theory expects that parties and voters will be aligned in their
preferences on Europe. Party leaders and voters are both primarily motivated
European Union Politics 8(1)1 4 6
by policy. Hence, if a group of voters and the party they support share the
same basic socioeconomic policy preferences, then they should have similar
preferences about how the EU should be designed (in terms of powers at the
European level and the national level) to achieve these socioeconomic policy
goals.
However, voters are usually less well informed about institutional design
questions (such as electoral reform, constitutional reform or EU integration)
than they are about the main policy issues in domestic politics (such as
education or health care), and so are likely to be more responsive to the views
of party leaders on institutional issues than on the bread-and-butter policy
issues. Nevertheless, the longer the issue of Europe is on the political agenda,
the harder it should be for party leaders to influence their voters’ opinions,
because citizens’ positions should start to harden as they begin to understand
the domestic policy consequences of European integration (see Hooghe and
Marks, 2006).
The evidence presented by Marco Steenbergen, Erica Edwards and
Catherine de Vries is broadly consistent with this approach. They find that
party elites and their supporters are closely aligned on the issue of Europe,
and this situation is maintained by a two-way interaction – party leaders
responding to voters and voters responding to leaders. Interestingly, though,
this connection has declined over time. They contend that this is a result of
declining ‘opinion leadership’ by mainstream political parties, which could
be fixed if parties had more able leaders or took clearer policy positions.
However, it might also be a result of the fact that citizens have increasingly
stable positions on Europe as they have gradually observed the policy con-
sequences of European integration. This would make citizens less responsive
to cues from party leaders.
Here’s where Gabel and Scheve fit in. They find that dissent within parties
reduces party voters’ support for Europe. One way of interpreting this is that
dissent reveals that party leaders have uncertain assessments of the policy
consequences of European integration or a particular set of institutional
reforms, such as the EU Constitution. Hence, if party leaders are split over the
likely policy direction of further integration, then so are party supporters.
Gabel and Scheve also argue that this means that party supporters have a
choice about whom they are going to be cued by. And uncertainty breeds
contempt: ‘If you don’t know, vote no’, as the ‘No’ campaign put it in the first
Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in June 2001. Linking back to Crum’s
paper, this also suggests a particular interpretation of the result of the 2005
referendum in France, where the French Socialist Party leadership and its
supporters were split on the question of Europe. On the one hand, this split
reflected a left–right split within the party, with the more centrist wing of the
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leadership supporting the EU Constitution and the more left-wing section of
the leadership and the bulk of the party supporters opposing the Constitution.
On the other hand, the split also reflected mixed expectations about the con-
sequences of the Constitution. The French Socialist Party members originally
voted in favour of the Constitution in an internal ballot. Once a wider public
debate took place, however, a large proportion of the socialist electorate
became concerned that the EU Constitution would lock-in a liberal free market
agenda. Against this, there were few concrete ‘social Europe’ policies that the
pro-Constitution forces on the left could hold up as evidence against this claim.
So, as policy expectations hardened, the majority of the voters for the 
Socialist Party began to side with the minority position in the Socialist Party
leadership.
Conclusion
Political science research in the past decade has come a long way in under-
standing what determines citizens’ and political parties’ attitudes towards
European integration, why some citizens and parties are Eurosceptic whereas
others are Europhile, and how citizens respond to parties and how parties
react to citizens when determining positions on the EU. The papers in this
special issue add to the richness of the existing research, clarify certain
existing suppositions, and add new findings about the strategic interaction
between parties and voters on the issue of Europe.
Nevertheless, as yet we do not have a unifying theoretical framework
within which to place the various propositions and against which to compare
the mounting empirical findings. What I have done here is sketch the basis
of a rational choice institutionalist framework for understanding actors’ atti-
tudes towards the EU. On one level, this seems a much too simplified model
for explaining the myriad of relationships that exist and shape citizens’ and
parties’ views about Europe. On another level, however, this framework
allows thinking about attitudes towards European integration to be connected
to general theoretical and historical concerns about which actors should prefer
centralized or decentralized government and under what conditions. Put this
way, the question facing us about Europe in the early 21st century is identi-
cal to the question Harold Laski grappled with about the UK and the USA
in the mid-20th century: am I more likely to get the policies I want from
greater policy centralization or from greater policy decentralization?
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Notes
1 Eurobarometer 62.1: The Constitutional Treaty, Economic Challenges, Vocational
Training, Information Technology at Work, Environmental Issues,
October–November 2004. Principal Investigator: Renaud Soufflot de Magny,
European Commission. Directorate-General Press and Communication.
Opinion Polls Sector. ICPSR Study No. 4341.
2 Data from Eurostat.
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